
Large Scale Disease Response and the Secure Food Supply Plans




Tahnee Szymanski, DVM

406-475-2569; tszymanski@mt.gov



FMD Around the World







Controlling FMD Spread


State/Federal Steps

Producer Steps

Stop Movement Stamping Out

Diagnostic Testing (clinical)

Emergency Vaccination



72 Hour National Movement Standstill - ASF

- Upon a confirmed detection of ASF virus in domestic pigs (not feral swine) on the mainland contiguous United States.
- All live swine that are in intrastate and interstate commerce at the start of the movement standstill must reach a destination and not be stopped on the road. Livestock in transit refers to pigs loaded in vehicles that have departed the point of loading, or pigs located in a livestock market.



ASF Response

Declaration of Extraordinary Emergency & 72-Hour National Movement Standstill July 10, 2023

Please note: These procedures may be revised as the situation develops or more information becomes available.

PURPOSE

This document provides policy for a USDA Extraordinary Emergency Declaration and 72-bus National Movement Standstill in the event of an African swine fever (ASF) outbreak on the mainland United States (not including Alaska, Hawaii, or U.S. Territories).

AUDIENC

This policy is for Officials, tribal officials, producers, owners, growers, private sector companies State, industry association organizations, and federal officials to plan for and implement a National Movement Standstill in the event of an ASF detection on the mainland linited States

This document is divided into three sections: summary policy, draft USDA Extraordinary Emergency Declaration, and draft 72-hour National Movement Standstill Federal Order.

SECTION 1: SUMMARY POLICY

- The USDA will execute a declaration of extraordinary emergency to implement a 72hour National Movement Standstill. USDA will communicate the requirements of the Standstill with State Animal Health Officials (SAHO) prior to an ASF outbreak and at the start of an ASF outbreak.
- The initiating event for a 72-hour National Movement Standstill will be a National Veterinary Services Laboratories (NVSL) confirmed detection of ASF virus in domestic pigs (not feral swine) located on the mainland contiguous United States. The USDA will communicate the starting time and stopping time for the 72-hour National Movement Standstill.
- The 72-hour National Movement Standstill applies to the intrastate and interstate movement of:
 - Domestic pigs,
 - Dead domestic pigs (dead stock pigs located on farms or premises, etc.),
 - o Feral swine (human movements and transportation of feral swine)
- ◆ The 72-hour National Movement Standstill does not apply to:
 - Pork meat or pork products,
 - o Swine germplasm (swine semen or swine embryos)
 - Feed or food for pigs, or feed or food for other livestock and poultry,
 - Livestock species other than pigs, such as cattle, sheep, goats, or poultry.

72 Hour Movement Standstill

- When the first case of FMD is detected in the U.S., it must be assumed that there may also be undetected cases of FMD.
- Guidance: Livestock already on trucks and in transit will be allowed to proceed to their intended destination. Animals at harvest facilities should be processed on schedule. Animals at auction markets, fairs, or exhibitions should be allowed to move to either their final destination or return to their place of origin unless they have been exposed to animals from what has been identified as a Control Area or suspect premises.

Managed Movement

- Nearly 3 million head of susceptible livestock species are transported to slaughter every week with countless more animals being transported between production phases.
- Beginning of outbreak
 - "Land the Planes!"
 - Continue or return?
 - No new movements of livestock
 - Packers, processors, auction markets may sit idle
- Control Area
 - Movement by permit only, based on risk

Managed Movement of Susceptible Livestock Species during a U.S. Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD) Outbreak: Overview



November 2019

Introduction

Movement restrictions³ of susceptible livestock species is one strategy for the control and containment of FMD during a U.S. outbreak. A 72-hour national movement standstill has been recommended by USDA during state/national excreises. Livestock operations affected by movement restrictions yet not infected with FMD will need to restart movement as soon as possible to support business continuity in a way that is consistent with mitigating the risk of spreading FMD. The Secure Food Supply (SFS) Plans for Continuity of Business are for operations with no evidence of FMD infection located in a Control Area to prepare to meet movement permit requirements² while reducing the risk of spreading the FMD virus. Numerous states have made progress in preplanning movement restrictions and permitting in the event of an FMD outbreak.

Phases of Livestock Movement Restrictions

FMD response strategies will be assessed and adjusted as the outbreak progresses and will depend on specific outbreak characteristics (see Figure 1).

FIGURE 1. TIMELINE OF EARLY MANAGED MOVEMENT EVENTS IN AN FMD OUTBREAK TESTING PHASE 1 PHASE 2 SUSPECT CASE Suspect · Suspect case confirmed · Extent of outbreak characterized case identified Control Area established around Efforts to restart permitted movement initiated infected premises Immediate quarantine - Stop movement in Control Area placed on National movement standstill suspect premises of susceptible species may · Trace back and be recommended trace forward In transit livestock movement managed efforts initiated Mobilization of permitting system DAY 0 DAY 1 DAY 3 OR LONGER ONGOING Plan, The Red Book, 2014 and the FAD PReP Constructed from information contained in the Foot and Mouth Strategy Document: Classification of Phases and Types of a Foot and Mouth Disease Outbreak and Response, 2013

Page 1 of 2

² For more information regarding movement permit guidance for cattle or pigs, see: http://securebeef.org/regulatory-officials/permit-guidance/ or http://www.securepork.org/regulatory-officials/permit-guidance/

Phase 1 – Initial Response Actions

- State-specific movement restrictions extending beyond a Control Area may be issued.
- Enhanced biosecurity practices and disease monitoring are encouraged for all premises and movements.
- Considerations for livestock in transit:
 - o Communicate next steps with transporters.
 - o Return to origin if livestock originated from an infected, suspect, or contact premises.
 - o If return is not possible or the destination will not accept livestock, identify an acceptable diversion quarantine site established by the state. Make plans for abandoned animals (unable to return or continue).
 - Length of transport time for the animals and driver must be considered.

Phase 2 – Restarting Movement

The following applies to all livestock with no evidence of FMD infection:

- Any livestock movement in a Control Area, regardless of its destination, will require a valid permit once movement is allowed to restart.
- The origin premises must meet permitting requirements, AND ensure the receiving premises is willing to accept the livestock, AND comply with the destination state requirements for all interstate movements.

Managed Movement

Abandonment

Issues may also arise with animals being abandoned either at commingling sites, such as livestock markets/buying stations, or at diversion and quarantine sites established by the state. More work needs to be done to develop options for shipments of livestock that are not accepted at their intended destination and cannot be returned to their origin premises.

Communicating with Livestock Transporters

After the first case of FMD in the U.S. is confirmed, transporters with loads of livestock in transit need to be quickly informed about movement restrictions and next steps. Reliance on existing communication systems and dispatchers will be needed for effective and rapid notification of transportation companies and their drivers. Livestock producers, transporters, and state officials should establish communication plans in the event animals are on the road during a standstill/stop movement order to prevent animal welfare concerns and overtime hours for drivers.

Managed Movement - Challenges

Restarting Movement

Phase 2

Farm Infected with FMD


FOOT-AND-MOUTH DISEASE
RESPONSE PLAN
THE RED BOOK

FAD PREP
Foreign Animal Disease
Preparedness & Response Plan

USDA
United States
Department of
Agriculture

Constitution of The State of

Goal: Control, contain, eradicate FMD as quickly as possible



Standstill Lifted for Farms
Outside the Control Area





Farm(s) in Control
Area, NOT infected
with FMD



www.securebeef.org








Goal: Prevent exposure, business continuity

72-hour Standstill

- If ASF, CSF, or FMD are detected in the US, the government will stop all movement of animals and animal products for 72 hours
- What happens at hour 73?
 - If your production/farm is in the control area, you will still be subject to standstill until disease has been eliminated

Index Infected Premises



FMD: The Red Book

Table 4-8. Movement from Inside a Control Area to Outside a Control Area from Specific Premises^a

Item Moving out of a Control Area from a/an	Infected Premises	Suspect Premises^	Contact Premises^	At-Risk Premises	Monitored Premises*
Susceptible animals	Prohibited, except under certain circumstances as determined by the IC.	Prohibited, except under certain circumstances as determined by the IC.	Prohibited, except under certain circumstances as determined by the IC.	At-Risk Premises must become Monitored Premises to move susceptible livestock out of a Control Area.	Allowed to move by permit approved by IC; surveillance, negative diagnostic tests, premises biosecurity, and risk- assessment may be required for permit.
Susceptible animal products	See COB plans for information on susceptible animal products, or guidance and processes as determined by the IC. Please see the OIE <i>Terrestrial Code</i> for specific guidance for inactivating FMDV.				
Other animals (non-susceptible livestock) from premises with susceptible species	Prohibited unless specific permit approved by IC and appropriate biosecurity measures and risk-assessment.	Prohibited unless specific permit approved by IC and appropriate biosecurity measures and risk- assessment.	Prohibited unless specific permit approved by IC and appropriate biosecurity measures and risk-assessment.	Allowed to move by permit approved by IC; surveillance and negative diagnostic tests for susceptible animals on premises, premises biosecurity, and risk-assessment may be required for permit.	Allowed to move by permit approved by IC; surveillance and negative diagnostic tests for susceptible animals on premises, premises biosecurity, and risk-assessment may be required for permit.

Permitted Movements

Traceability

- Transparency to industry, States, public
- Reporting to trade partners
- Demonstrate outbreak control



Source: <u>USDA Ready Reference Guide:</u> Defining Permitted Movement, Feb 2017

Types of Permits

Specific – relate to controlling and containing the FAD outbreak, to achieve biocontainment and bioexclusion

Negligible Risk, Low Risk, Moderate or High Risk

Continuity of business (COB)

- Operational *not for animals*
- <u>Secure Food Supply</u> for movements of animals and animal products into the supply chain for feeding, growing, processing, or to market

Permit Guidance

www.securebeef.org

	rmitting Guidance for Movement Cattle/Semen/Embryos	Condition Met?
1.	Traceability information is available (PIN, GPS Coordinates, and information on type and number of animals/quantity of semen/embryos to be moved)	Yes
2.	Trace-back/forward information is acceptable; premises is NOT infected, contact, suspect	Yes
3.	Destination premises and state are willing to accept the cattle/semen/embryos	Yes
4.	Biosecurity measures listed in the Biosecurity Checklist are in place and acceptable to responsible regulatory officials	Yes
5.	No evidence of infection based on disease monitoring (surveillance)	Yes

Regulatory Officials may issue a movement permit if above conditions are met



Swine Health Improvement Plan

U.S. SHIP

Controlling FMD Spread

State/Federal Steps


Producer Steps

Stop
Movement

Stamping
Out

Diagnostic
Testing
(clinical)

Emergency
Vaccination



Benefits of SHIP Certification

- If your farm is OUTSIDE of the control zone AND you can demonstrate freedom from disease by providing animal movement data, have an enhanced biosecurity plan in place, and are prepared to meet SHIP requirements (i.e.: testing) you will have priority for a movement permit from the state veterinarian.
 - Improves animal well-being
 - Decreases financial losses
 - Allows business to continue
 - Provides nourishing food

SHIP Requirements

Enrollment form

• Requires Premises Identification Number (PIN)

Biosecurity survey

Ability to provide 30 days of movement data in an electronic format (AgView, RabApp)

Biosecurity plan (Secure Pork Supply Plan) No testing required during peacetime (no disease in US)

Framework for Interstate and Intrastate Movement Decisions During an FMD Outbreak -DRAFT

- Areas outside of Control Area are currently considered Free Areas therefore movements are free from regulatory movement restrictions.
- Recommendations:
 - Only essential low-risk movements should be allowed for the first 28-days (two maximum FMD incubation periods) *Limited Movement Period*
 - Provides increased opportunity to find all infected premises.
 - Movements that are considered essential <u>and</u> low-risk would be allowed during and after the 28 day-limited movement period

Table 1: Essential Low-risk Movements

The following movements (either intrastate or interstate) could be considered essential low-risk movements at the end of the 72-hour standstill and should be allowed without the need for an FMD-related permit:

- · Movement of animals outside of a Control Area to a packing plant
- Movement of animals in a biosecure building to another biosecure building (according to the Secure Food Supply plans) if it is essential to move the animals for welfare purposes.
- Movement of animals from an isolated location (e.g., pasture, lot, or building) to another location without exposure to new animals if it is essential for welfare purposes.

Permission for other intrastate or interstate movements during the Limited Movement Period should be requested from the SAHO by providing documentation that the movement is essential and is low-risk (See Appendix A).

Preparing Now

Resources for Producers

Control What You Can

Preparedness



Traceability info (PIN, GPS Coordinates, etc.)



Enhanced biosecurity plan ready to go



Record keeping (Animals, people, deliveries)

Outbreak Factors



Control Area Location



Not Infected, Suspect, Contact Premises




Destination willing to accept movement



No evidence of infection

Traceability

Click on a State to learn more about how to obtain a PIN or LID in that State:




✓Get PremID or PIN

- 911 address
- Latitude, longitude
- Already have one?
 Make sure info is up to date

Puerto Rico: https://www.agricultura.pr/ ☑ U.S. Virgin Islands: Contact the Director of Veterinary Services, Virgin Islands Department of Agriculture at (340) 778-0997

Trace-back/Trace-forward


- Records demonstrate not a Contact Premises
 - Movement logs
 - Practice questionnaire
- Permits not issued to Infected, Suspect, Contact Premises
 - Health records, no clinical signs noted, samples tested




Protecting the Herd

- Most cattle, sheep producers have not dealt with new, highly contagious disease
 - Enhanced biosecurity needed
 - Animals never zero risk of exposure


It will be hard for some herds to go from getting started to enhanced biosecurity...



Big journeys begin with small steps



Movement Risks





Step 1: Movement Risks

EXPLANATION OF MOVEMENTS

STEP 1: MOVEMENT RISKS AND BIOSECURITY

Items moving on and off your farminanch can bring disease. Identifying movement risks can help you prevent them. Check the box that best describes how often each movement occurs. Are most of your checkmarks in the two left columns (lower risk)? Great! Fewer movements help keep disease away from your animals. Do you have items marked in the three right columns frighter risk!? Those need your attention first. Pick one or two to start. Find Biosecurity Tip Sheets (available at: <u>Chephinatate.ed/biosecurity</u>) to glearn about changes you can make. Continue working on biosecurity with Step 2: Biosecurity checklist and Step 3: Biosecurity Plan template to write your biosecurity plan. These resources can help you protect your animals? health!

		INCREASI	NG LEVEL	OF RISK -	$\rightarrow \rightarrow \rightarrow$	$\rightarrow \rightarrow \rightarrow$
INPUTS/OUTPUTS	MOVEMENT	NEVER	YEARLY	MONTHLY	WEEKLY	DAILY
	Incoming animals/birds					
	Outgoing animals/birds					
Animals and	Semen/embryos					
Animal Products	Milk, colostrum, eggs (whole shell, liquid, hatching)					
	Dead animal removal					
	Manure, litter, or compost removal					
	Feed					
Deliveries	Bedding					
Deliveries	Fuel, propane, CO2					
	Livestock/poultry trucks, trailers					
	Mail, package delivery services, etc.					
Personnel	People with animal contact					
Personnei	People without animal contact					
	Trash, recycling					
	Wildlife, rodents, birds, neighbor dogs or cats					
Other	Grounds keeping					
	Traffic related to residence, home					

ing from shows, fairs, or breeding. to shows, fairs, or breeding that other operations. nay visit other farms/ranches go to other animal operations. ans, Al techs, extension, agritourism riders, agritourism visitors without COULD BRING DISEASE or go off of your operation. e Center for Food Security and Public tment of Agriculture (USDA) Animal dness and Response Program AWD-021794-00001 through the North al opportunity employer and service this publication are those of the ty is an equal opportunity provider. For • Fill it out for a typical week or month

Focus on daily movements first

 What initial biosecurity steps could protect the herd?

www.cfsph.iastate.edu/biosecurity/

The Center for Food Security & Public Healt

cfsph.iastate.edu/biosecurity Step 1 Movement Risks & Biosecurity · 2021 · Page 1



Where can I learn more?

Biosecurity Tip Sheets provide more info on biosecurity actions to protect your herd!

BREEDING ANIMALS ANIMAL MOVEMENTS Examine and test breeding



Animals brought in for bree period of time. Semen or embryos should

- Breeding equipment share disinfected before use.
- Prevent unplanned mating

SHOW ANIMALS

- Livestock that have left yo quarantined for a period of
- Limit, as much as possible
- Avoid sharing equipment v Equipment such as feed o leads, and halters can easi
- Make sure that animal hou and disinfected before allo

EMERGENCY PLAN

Plan ahead. Disasters may req the movement of animals or fee decrease the impact and speed

 Include how you will care f other needed items.

ASSESSMENT CHECKLE Use the following checklist to d

YES	NO	After answith the r
		Do you buy
		Are new or them with y
		Is separate
		Do you have event that c

MORE RESOURCES:

Biosecurity at Pig Shows: Safet

Farm Emergency Preparedness

Interstate Regulations for Anima

The Center for Foo Security & Public I

BIOSECURITY TIP SHEET

Animals moving on and off your operation can spread disease. Biosecurity steps can help stop disease spread. Animal movement includes new animals. It also includes animals returning to your farm/ranch after shows, breeding, grazing off-farm or medical care

ANIMAL IDENTIFICATION (ID) AND RECORD KEEPING

Animal ID helps keep good records on status, health and movements. Follow state and federal ID requirements when moving animals. Some livestock need individual ID and others can be identified as a group or lot.

- . ID options include ear tags (plastic, metal, radiofrequency), tattoos, brands, or leg bands.
- · Records should include animal origin, age, treatments, vaccines, current location, and movement history.



A plastic ear tag is one way to identify cattle. Source: ISU Extension and Outreach



identify groups of poultry. Source: Danelle Bickett-Weddle.



identification tags Source: Danelle Bickett-Weddle.

INCOMING ANIMALS

Animals brought in from outside sources are a greater risk to your herd than those born and raised on your farm. Incoming animals may not look sick but may be carrying disease. To protect your herd or flock:

- · Purchase animals only from disease-free sources. New animals should come from sources whose biosecurity practices are similar to, or better
- . Animals from out of state may need to be tested for diseases. Follow all state and federal testing rules
- Vaccinate new animals before allowing them to enter your herd or flock.
- Test and/or treat new animals for parasites. Transport livestock in cleaned and disinfected trailers or crates.
- All incoming animals should be in guarantine for a period of time. usually 21-30 days. Work with your veterinarian to set animal
- Train animal caretakers on how to recognize sick animals.



Truck with a trailer and yellow crates used to transport birds. Source: Lindsay Harlow, Pennsylvania



cfsph.iastate.edu/biosecurity Animal Movements Tip Sheet · 2021 · Page 1

www.cfsph.iastate.edu/biosecurity/



Tip Sheet Topics

- Protecting Your Herd/Flock
- Animal Health and Disease Monitoring
- Vehicles and Equipment
- Cleaning and Disinfection
- Personnel (Family, Employees, Visitors)
- Animal Movement
- Carcass Disposal
- Manure, Litter, Bedding Management
- Wildlife, Rodent, Other Animal Control
- Feed and Water
- More!











 Biosecurity checklist has a series of questions to find strengths and gaps





Checklist Topics

- Training
- Protecting Your Herd
- Animal Health and Disease Monitoring
- Vehicles and Equipment
- Cleaning and Disinfection
- Personnel (Family, Employees, Visitors)
- Animal Movement
- Animal Products
- Carcass Disposal
- Manure, Litter, Bedding Management
- Wildlife, Rodent, Other Animal Control
- Feed and Water







www.cfsph.iastate.edu/biosecurity/



Step 3: BQA Template



- Ready to write a plan?
- Beef Quality Assurance (BQA) Daily Biosecurity Plan Template
 - Content aligns with Step 2 Checklist: Beef
- Voluntary

https://www.bqa.org/Media/BQA/Docs/bqa-daily-biosecurity-plan_12-04-2020-93.pdf

Self-Assessment Checklist for Enhanced Biosecurity for FMD Prevention: Cattle on Pasture



Recommendations for Biosecurity

Fach sulf-assistment should be here has fined possible responses, described below. Implementation of each component is asserted to greater while early and protect the health and width-king of the arms is on the

- In place, <u>All</u> items are addressed in the Nessearity plan and are implemented in the operation as evidenced by visual respective or by signed and/or dated documentation, as applicable.
- To people of Sono but on vil of the term an addressed of the beassarity plan and an or an expable of being, implemented on the operation or existenced invasional imperior or by signed. and/or duted documentation, as applicable.

 Not in place: The from <u>large not been</u> addressed in the biasecurity plac or are not qualifie of being

1. Biosecurity Manager and Written Plan

A Parametrity Narrager is identified for the operation. The individual is responsible to their oping the freezentry plan with the accounts of a voter partial (if they are not a voter fortunity) and assuming It reacting training of, or communicating be-estably measures with all individuals who or lat the operation. The Nicoscopiny Manager has the written authority to ensure compliance with his security products and blo company; south as readen.

□ le noues.

'a operation-specific, written, enhanced bioscentity plus has been developed by the Bioscentity Manager. The plan is reviewed at least annually and offenesses the operation goes through a change that affices bisesses also (appendix of its a new append of the bestices, etc.). He histocrafty planed only defines the except of the operation, and includes histocrafts for other second place points but not as prenies. The binestrate plan includes a map of the operation indicating the Line of Separation (LOS), LOS Access Point to, changing our distintionies (CAD) stations: A originated perhing many our convey deposits picture for the map make to solition to contract animal temporal chicks. Activation steps and across removed patrongs. The Biosecutty Manager ensures that all califoldade energy the operation frequently (world) or more often have seems to a copy of the biocounts plan. The Biosecusty Manager is supublic of implementing the scatteringles, if FMD is diagramed in the U.S.

□ h plax

□ in group as

□ Not in obec


The "Greecurity Manager and essential personnel are trained at least accounty short the "Greecurity measure necessary to keep PMD out of the head; touring is free mented. The Histocautty Manager informs individuals antenne the operation of trooppoints measures floor and following a binequestion reviewand. Individuals are aware of the Nascourity concepts and procedures that apply to their specific areas of no possibility. The hoseourity plan describes training sequend below enlaring this operator


II la place □ le progress D'Not in place

3. Protecting Your Cattle

Line of Separation (LCS)
The brokersity plan reduces at LCS, which is established as an outer control boundary process, or within, the premises to first movement of vine into creas where susceptible animals can be exposed

\$35 Noor Bossic to Dissect and Distouring - Contain or Fortune Containing 2020





GETTING STARTED









Routine Biosecurity

Trichomoniasis

Bovine Respiratory Disease

Bovine Viral Diarrhea

Calf Scours

Enhanced Biosecurity for Feedlots, Pasture

INFORMATION MANUAL FOR ENHANCED BIOSECURITY FOR FMD PREVENTION:

CATTLE ON PASTURE

October 2020



ION MANUAL FOR BIOSECURITY FOR MD PREVENTION: BEEF FEEDLOTS

October 2020



Page 1 of 12

Self-Assessment Checklist for Enhanced Biosecurity for FMD Prevention: Cattle on Pasture



Recommendations for Biocourity

Each self-assessment checklist item has component is essential to prevent virus operation.

- In place: <u>All</u> items are addresse
- In progress: Some, but not all, capable of being, implemented and/or dated documentation, as
- Not in place: The items have no implemented on the operation.

1. Biosecurity Manager a

A Biosecurity Manager is identific biosecurity plan with the assistance biosecurity training of, or commun operation. The Biosecurity Manage protocols and take corrective action

☐ In place

An operation-specific, written, enh Manager. The plan is reviewed at I affects biosecurity (expands, adds i defines the scope of the operation, premises. The biosecurity plan incl LOS Access Point(s), cleaning and disposal/pickup location. The map etc.) and carcass removal pathways operation frequently (weekly or m Biosecurity Manager is capable of

☐ In place

2. Training

The Biosecurity Manager and esser measures necessary to keep FMD of informs individuals entering the op understand. Individuals are aware of areas of responsibility. The biosecu

□ In place

3. Protecting Your Cattle

Line of Separation (LOS)
The biosecurity plan includes an L
within, the premises to limit mover

SBS PLAN: ENHANCED BIOSECURITY CHECKLIST OCTOBER 2020

Self-Assessment Checklist for Enhanced Biosecurity for FMD Prevention: Beef Feedlots



Recommendations for Biosecurity

Each self-assessment checklist item has three possible responses, described below. Implementation of each component is essential to prevent virus entry and protect the health and well-being of the animals on the oneration.

- In place: All items are addressed in the biosecurity plan and implemented on the feedlot as
 evidenced by visual inspection or by signed and/or dated documentation, as applicable.
- In progress: <u>Some</u>, but not all, of the items are addressed in the biosecurity plan and are, or are
 capable of being, implemented on the feedlot as evidenced by visual inspection or by signed and/or
 dated documentation, as applicable.
- Not in place: The items <u>have not been</u> addressed in the biosecurity plan or are not capable of being implemented on the feedlot.

1. Biosecurity Manager and Written Plan

A Biosecurity Manager is identified for the feedlot. This individual is responsible for developing the biosecurity plan with the assistance of a veterinarian (if they are not a veterinarian) and ensuring biosecurity training of, or communicating biosecurity measures with, all individuals who enter the feedlot. The Biosecurity Manager has the written authority to ensure compliance with biosecurity protocols and take corrective action as needed.

☐ In place ☐ In progress ☐ Not in place

A feedlot-specific, written, enhanced biosecurity plan has been developed by the Biosecurity Manager. The plan is reviewed at least annually and whenever the feedlot goes through a change that affects biosecurity (expands, adds a new aspect of the business, etc.). The biosecurity plan clearly defines the scope of the operation and includes biosecurity for other susceptible species kept on the premises. The biosecurity plan includes a map of the feedlot indicating the Line of Separation (LOS), LOS Access Point(s), cleaning and disinfection (CEQ) station(s), designated parking area, and carcass disposal pickup location. The map indicates vehicle movements (animal transport vehicles, deliveries, etc.) and carcass removal pathways. The Biosecurity Manager ensures that all individuals entering the feedlot frequently (weekly or more often) have access to a copy of the biosecurity plan. The Biosecurity Manager is capable of implementing the written plan if FMD is diagnosed in the U.S.

☐ In place	☐ In progress	☐ Not in place

2. Training

The Biosccurity Manager and essential personnel are trained at least annually about the biosecurity measures necessary to keep FADD out of the herrt, training is documented. The Biosecurity Manager informs individuals entering the operation of biosecurity measures they are to follow in a language they understand. Individuals are aware of the biosecurity concepts and procedures that apply to their specific areas of responsibility. The biosecurity plan describes training required before entering this feedled.

ot in	□ Not in	☐ In progress	☐ In place
ΟI		☐ In progress	☐ In place

3. Protecting Your Cattle

Line of Separation (LOS)

The biosecurity plan includes an LOS, which is established as an outer control boundary around, or within, the premises to limit movement of virus into areas where susceptible animals can be exposed.

SBS – Public Lands

Supporting producers, decision makers

Movement Decision Criteria for Industry and Regulatory Officials Managing Cattle and Sheep Grazing Federal Public Lands during a Foot-and-Mouth Disease (FMD) Outbreak

November 2023 - FINAL DRAFT FOR REVIEW

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This guidance document describes three movement options and five decision criteria for industry and regulatory officials to consider when managing cattle and sheep grazing federal public lands that are <u>affected</u> by movement controls (quarantine, Control Areas) but are <u>not infected</u> with foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) during an outbreak in the United States. This document was created through collaborative discussions between cattle and sheep producers, livestock industry associations, state and federal animal health officials, federal agencies for land management and wildlife management.

Movement options for livestock grazing on federal public lands in a Control Area that are not designate as Infected, Suspect or Contact Premises (herds/flocks) include:

- 1. Staying in place until the Control Area movement restrictions are lifted.
- 2. Moving within the Control Area.
- Moving outside of the Control Area to a biosecure location that can quarantine livestock away from susceptible species.

The decision criteria to ensure animal needs and response goals are met include:

- Assessing availability, suitability of adequate feed/water
- 2. Monitoring for disease (surveillance)
- 3. Mitigating interactions with wildlife
- 4. Controlling public access to Control Areas
- 5. Implementing just-in-time biosecurity

Interagency collaboration opportunities between the federal land management agencies who issue public land grazing use permits (Bureau of Land Management, U.S. Forest Service) with the agencies who would manage an FMD outbreak response (USDA Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service and State Animal Health Officials) and the agencies that oversee wildlife (U.S. Fish and Wildlife Services, USDA APHIS Wildlife Services) are also described.

Guidance aligns with the USDA FMD Response Plan (Oct 2020), and is cognizant of BLM and USFS jurisdiction, referring to current versions of Code of Federal Regulations, instructional memorandums, manuals, and directives. Where applicable, the outbreak movement <u>permit</u> guidance in the Secure Bee Supply (SBS) and Sheep and Wool Supply (SSWS) Plans are followed. Modifications that account for grazing public lands include:

- Using allotment/pasture number/name instead of Premises Identification Number (PIN)
- Describing enhanced biosecurity steps to regulatory officials (using the newly created Just-in-Time Biosecurity and Exposure Questionnaire for FMD: Livestock Grazing Public Lands)
- Conducting disease monitoring within the same Control Area or at a biosecure location that
 meets quarantine requirements for at least 28 days

USDA NADPRP Grant

- "Developing movement decision criteria and exercising movement plans for livestock grazing public land allotments in and around FAD control areas through collaboration with industry, state, and federal partners"
 - Feb 2022-Feb 2024
 - American Sheep Industry Association
 - National Cattlemen's Beef Association
 - · Consultant: Danelle Bickett-Weddle, Preventalytics

Resource Creation

Movement Decisions Criteria

Management Practices/ FMD Exposure Risks

Roles of Agencies

BLM, USFS, USDA APHIS, States, Wildlife

Just-in-Time Biosecurity/ FMD Exposure Questionnaire

Table of Contents

Introduction	3
National Movement Standstill	
Control Areas	5
Options to Consider – Decision Criteria	7
Assessing Availability and Suitability of Adequate Feed/Water	8
Monitoring for Disease (Surveillance)	11
Mitigating Interactions with Wildlife	15
Controlling Public Access to Control Areas	17
Implementing Just-in-Time Biosecurity	18
Permitting Movements in an Outbreak	19
Acknowledgements	23
Abbreviations and Terminology used in Document	
Appendix A: USDA Definitions	25
Appendix B: Applicable Code of Federal Regulations for Interagency Response to a Foreign Animal Disease Outbreak	26
Appendix C: USFS and BLM Organization and Responsibilities	30
Appendix D: Draft Letter Requesting Allotment/Pasture Closure	31
Appendix E: Active Observational Surveillance Excerpt from FMD Response Plan	32
Appendix F: Full CFRs, BLM Instructional Memo's, USFS Manual, USFS Directive	33